COMMENTS

"An Officer of the House Which Chooses Him, and
Nothing More": How Should Marsh v Chambers
Apply to Rotating Chaplains?
Jeremy G. Malloryt

INTRODUCION

The occasions for legislative prayer include the everyday, the far-

cical, and the momentous. The people delivering legislative prayers
have ranged from the traitorous Jacob Duch6' to the stirring Peter

Marshall (who became a celebrity in his own right2), to the thunderous
John Brackenridge (who foreshadowed the burning of the Capitol and
the White House during the War of 18123). Many, like the chaplains to

Congress, are employed on a continuing basis; others are local ministers called in on a rotating basis to deliver an invocation before the

meeting of a legislative body.4

f B.A. 1995, Swarthmore College; Ph.D. 2004, The University of Chicago Divinity School;
J.D. Candidate 2007,The University of Chicago.
I See Jacob Duch6 to George Washington (Philadelphia, Pa, Oct 8, 1777), in Worthington
Chauncey Ford, ed, The Washington-Duchg Letters 9 (privately printed Brooklyn, NY 1890)
(urging General Washington to give up on "the fatal declaration of independency").
2
See Mary Elizabeth Goin, Catherine Marshall: Three Decades of PopularReligion, 56 J
Presbyterian Hist 219, 221 (1978) (observing that by the time of his appointment to the chaplaincy in 1947, "Peter Marshall had become more than a leader in his denomination; he was a
recognized spiritual leader for all America").
3
See Margaret Bayard Smith, The First Forty Years of Washington Society 16-17 (Scribner's Sons 1906) (Gaillard Hunt, ed) (describing Brackenridge's sermon, made prior to the British attack of the Capitol, which warned, "it is the government that will be punished").
4
For example, the chaplaincy at issue in Simpson v Chesterfield County Board of Supervisors, 404 F3d 276 (4th Cir 2005), is such a rotating position. See id at 279 (noting that instead of
choosing a single chaplain, the Board invites religious leaders from various congregations in the
county). For the purposes of this Comment, the term "rotating chaplaincy" signifies a legislative
prayer practice that does not involve a chaplain hired on a permanent basis by the legislature. A
rotating chaplain might even be a private citizen. Further, the term "minister," both as a noun
and as a verb, is used in a broad sense, encompassing diverse forms of pastoral care and types of
people who may give it, regardless of denomination, religion, or the particular connotations of
the title. The foundational part of both chaplaincy practices is the invocation delivered before a
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In Marsh v Chambers, the Supreme Court essentially set aside
legislative chaplaincies as exceptions to the Establishment Clause,' but
it did not distinguish between these two types of chaplain-situated
and rotating. Marsh specifically found unobjectionable the chaplaincy
practices of the Nebraska State Legislature and the United States
Congress (both of which included chaplains as regular employees of
the body), but did not address itself to other types of practice.! The
Court sustained the practice of legislative chaplaincies based on the
"unique history" of the congressional chaplaincies, arguing that the
Framers of the First Amendment would not have created such an institution if it violated the amendment they had just written.8 The Court
then applied the same reasoning to the Nebraska chaplaincy (and by
implication other state chaplaincies, whether similar or not).9 Later
courts have simply referred directly to Marsh's approval of legislative

chaplaincies, failing to distinguish between these two species of chaplain.' Because the Supreme Court has not had a chance to revisit
Marsh directly, the precise boundaries of the exception have become
legislative body begins official business. For a rotating chaplain, this is where the job usually
ends. For a situated chaplain, the job will also include other types of pastoral care and outreach,
including Bible study, individual counseling, and prayer. Further, in this Comment "legislative
body" and "legislature" are used generically to refer to any level of government-federal, state,
county, local, school district-unless specific reference or context makes clear that it refers to a
particular level. Finally, the term "institution" (especially "legislative institution") is used to
indicate the voting body itself as well as all of the officers, employees, and others who comprise a
legislative branch of some level of government.
5 463 US 783 (1983) (holding that the Nebraska legislature's practice of opening each
session with a prayer led by a situated chaplain paid with public funds did not violate the Establishment Clause).
6
The majority did not explicitly characterize Marsh as an exception to the Establishment
Clause, but did acknowledge the "unique history" forming the backdrop to the decision. See id at
791. The dissent, however, explicitly noted its exceptional nature. Id at 796 (Brennan dissenting)
("[T]he Court is carving out an exception to the Establishment Clause rather than reshaping
Establishment Clause doctrine."). Further, this is the characterization that has been adopted by
subsequent courts. See, for example, Lee v Weisman, 505 US 577, 585 (1992) (affirming a district
court decision declining to extend Marsh beyond the legislative prayer context); Snyder v
Murray City Corp, 159 F3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir 1998) (en banc) (describing the issue in Marsh as
"a sui generis legal question"); Kurtz v Baker, 829 F2d 1133, 1147 (DC Cir 1987) (Ginsburg dissenting) (describing Marsh as "a special nook-a narrow space tightly sealed off from otherwise
applicable first amendment doctrine").
7
See Marsh, 463 US at 794 n 18 (mentioning that state practices vary widely with some
states using rotating chaplains, but not addressing the legal implications of the diverging practices).
8
See id at 791 ("This unique history leads us to accept the interpretation of the First
Amendment draftsmen who saw no real threat to the Establishment Clause arising from a practice of prayer similar to that now challenged.").
9 See id at 792-95 (noting and rejecting challenges to the Nebraska practice based on the
single denomination of the chaplain, his payment from public coffers, and the Judeo-Christian
nature of the prayers).
10 See, for example, Snyder, 159 F3d at 1232-33 (interpreting Marsh as defining a "genre" of
legislative prayer "separate from the particular nuances of the ... practice there under review").
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ambiguous. Phrased starkly, chaplains employed by the legislature as

counselors are treated under the same rubric as chaplains who deliver
a single prayer and leave.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Simpson v Chesterfield County

Board of Supervisors" demonstrates that this ambiguity can mask
threats to core Establishment Clause values such as nonhostility 2 In

Simpson, a minister was denied a (rotating) opportunity to deliver an
invocation before the county board explicitly because of her religion:
she was a Wiccan priestess." The Fourth Circuit deferred to the county
board's choice of minister, citing the holding in Marsh" and dismissing

the possible presence of religious hostility in a footnote." The Fourth
Circuit did not take seriously a substantial allegation of hostility, giv-

ing little consideration to the admonition in Lynch v Donnelly6 that
"the Constitution ...forbids hostility toward any [religion].""
There is a looming dispute over whether practices that resemble,

but do not duplicate, the situated chaplaincies at stake in Marsh
should enjoy the same protection from Establishment Clause scrutiny.
In Simpson, the Fourth Circuit extended Marsh to protect a rotating
chaplaincy from scrutiny even when a core Establishment Clause
value, nonhostility, was allegedly infringed.'8 In Snyder v Murray City

Corp,9 however, from the Tenth Circuit, a concurring opinion questioned whether Marsh should be extended to cover anything other

11 404 F3d 276 (4th Cir 2005).
12 See Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668, 673 (1984) ("[The Constitution] affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any.").
13 404 F3d at 280 (noting that the County Attorney told Simpson that the nonsectarian invocations before the board are "traditionally made to a divinity that is consistent with the JudeoChristian tradition"-a divinity that would not be invoked by Simpson, a Wiccan).
14 See id at 285 (finding the county's clergy selection policy consistent with the types of
chaplaincy programs sustained by Marsh).
15 The Fourth Circuit did acknowledge prejudicial comments from members of the Board
of Supervisors in a footnote, but did not deem them of constitutional import. Id at 285 n 4 (noting that one member of the Board called Simpson's faith "a mockery" in an interview and another said she hoped Simpson was "a good witch like Glenda," then deciding that neither indicated that the county did not "seriously consider[ ]Simpson's request").
16 465 US 668 (1984).
17 Id at 673 (holding that a city did not violate the Establishment Clause by including a
nativity scene in its Christmas display). Although other portions of Lynch have come into question, this statement of the core value of nonhostility has not. See generally Richard S. Myers,. The
Establishment Clause and Nativity Scenes: A Reassessment of Lynch v. Donnelly, 77 Ky L J 61
(1988) (analyzing lower court complications resulting from Lynch and other legal commentary
that criticizes Lynch, but making no reference to any objections to the nonhostility value).
18 See Simpson, 404 F3d at 287.
19 159 F3d 1227 (10th Cir 1998).
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than situated, institutionalized chaplaincies.2 ° The interpretive problem
is therefore how far to extend the rationale of Marsh to institutions
that resemble, but do not duplicate, the specific chaplaincy institutions
in question there.
This Comment offers a solution to the interpretive problem: a
finer-grained analysis of how rotating chaplaincies fit into the reasoning of Marsh. It approaches legislative chaplaincies by examining them
from the vantage point of the legislature's actions and the chaplain's
prayers. Essentially, an analysis of the legislature's actions is more important for judging whether a rotating chaplaincy violates the Establishment Clause, but the content of the chaplain's prayers will be more
relevant for a situated chaplaincy.
Analyzed in terms of the legislature's actions, a rotating chaplaincy program allows a legislature to mask motives, such as a desire
for a religious test for office, which would be constitutionally impermissible if acted upon in the context of a situated chaplaincy program.
As a result, courts must scrutinize the legislature's proffered motivations more closely where rotating chaplaincies are concerned in order
to preserve the core Establishment Clause principle of nonhostility
within the Marsh exception.2
Analyzed in terms of chaplains' prayers, both situated and rotating chaplains are equally able to run afoul of the Establishment
Clause by delivering sectarian prayers," but rotating chaplains may
face a greater temptation to do so because of the nature of the selection process and the lack of ongoing pastoral connection. Nevertheless, delivering sectarian prayers is not inevitable, and a judicious rotating chaplain poses no greater threat than a situated chaplain. A
court should be aware of the temptations, however, and should scrutinize the overall rotating chaplaincy program closely to ensure that
there is no structural Establishment Clause violation. Because of the
20
Id at 1238 (Lucero concurring) ("[W]hen the person giving a legislative prayer does not
speak from an established chaplaincy position, then Marsh ... is inapplicable."). There is no
outright circuit split on this point yet, but one could develop in the future.
21
There are, of course, other core Establishment Clause principles, such as neutrality and
separation. Justice Brennan examined these in his Marsh dissent and found legislative chaplaincies violated both of them. Marsh, 463 US at 795-808 (Brennan dissenting). Whether or not
Justice Brennan was correct in his argument is an interesting discussion that would take this
Comment too far afield. This Comment will focus on nonhostility as a core Establishment Clause
value that can easily be lost through blanket applications of Marsh to dissimilar facts.
22
See id at 794-95 (majority) (approving of prayers "where... there is no indication that
the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any
other, faith or belief'). See also Hinrichs v Bosma, 440 F3d 393, 399 (7th Cir 2006) (interpreting
Marsh as forbidding sectarian prayer); Bacus v Palo Verde School District,52 Fed Appx 355,356
(9th Cir 2002) (finding prayers before school board meetings unconstitutional due to their sectarian content).
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greater temptations and dangers, the level of scrutiny for rotating chaplaincies should be higher than that afforded to situated chaplains.
This Comment will proceed from background to foreground, beginning in Part I with an overview of legislative chaplaincies as they
exist today, both in Congress and in the states. Part II examines the
relevant legal standards, most notably Marsh itself (high deference to
legislative choices in structuring chaplaincy programs) and Lemon v
Kurtzman2' (low deference, as a matter of background Establishment
Clause jurisprudence). Part II goes on to discuss Marsh's progeny,
which have taken one of two forms: a challenge to the legislature's
administration of the chaplaincy program or to the chaplain's prayers
themselves. Part III gives a fine-grained analysis of the characteristics
of both types of challenges, illuminating how the different functions of
the two types of chaplain impact the legal assessment of the threat to
the Establishment Clause. Rotating chaplaincies will call for a greater
scrutiny of the legislature's administration of the chaplaincy program,
due to the ease of masking impermissible motives within an otherwise-innocuous rotating chaplaincy program, and the lack of structural
incentives for a rotating chaplain to minister to a plural congregation.
On the other hand, an analysis of the content of prayers is more important in the context of a situated chaplaincy.
I. BACKGROUND: FROM "AN APOSTATE AND TRAITOR" TO "THE
MOST POWERFUL MAN IN WASHINGTON"

Legislative chaplaincies have evolved from a history more checkered than that of Congress itself, arriving at a multifaceted institution
found in both the federal Congress and the state legislatures. In 1777,
John Adams tersely remarked to his wife Abigail, with regard to the
first chaplain of the Continental Congress: "Mr. Duch, I am sorry to
inform you, has turned out an apostate and traitor."4 Through a series
of raucous interludes, such as the brief period of rotating chaplains in
Congress,2' the institution took on a more dignified and stately mien.
By 1995, columnist Cal Thomas could, with only a little hyperbole, say
of retiring Senate Chaplain Richard Halverson, "according to some
who know him best, he has been the most powerful man in Washington." This history of colorful characters has generated a set of practices on both the state and federal levels that skirts the edges of the
403 US 602 (1971).
John Adams to Abigail Adams (Yorktown, Pa. Oct 25, 1777), in Frank Shuffleton, ed,
The Letters of John andAbigailAdams 320 (Penguin 2004).
25 See note 149 (discussing this period).
26 Cal Thomas, Soul of the US. Senate Was No Mere Accessory, Tines Union (Albany, NY)
A15 (Nov 9,1994).
23
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Establishment Clause." First, this Part will discuss the crucial distinc-

tion between situated and rotating chaplaincies, and then will briefly
survey the institutions as they have developed.

A. Situated and Rotating Chaplains
The chief difference between situated and rotating chaplains is

the nature of their relationship with the legislative body; a situated
chaplain has a formalized, ongoing relationship with the legislature,
similar to employment, while a rotating chaplain does not. Rotating
chaplains deliver invocations both by invitation and as volunteers.2
Situated chaplains are generally viewed as part of the legislative

institution itself. According to one judge, "[c]ongressional chaplains,
like the chaplain at issue in Marsh, are not members of the public invited on some representative or wholly open basis to give legislative

prayers. They are officers of the state, who hold official government
positions."29' This would extend, by analogy, to situated chaplains at
other levels of government.0 In addition to delivering invocations,
situated chaplains take on the general pastoral care of the legislative
body. This may include outreach such as Bible study groups, individual
counseling, and prayers.3 1

Rotating chaplains, by contrast, are generally only involved with
saying an invocation before the beginning of official business.2 They
are not usually described as providing any sort of further pastoral
27
The history itself, as alluded to here and in text accompanying notes 1-3, is fascinating,
but largely aside from the content of this Comment with only a few exceptions. For a deeper
analysis and summary of the history, see generally Robert C. Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989: Addresses on the History of the United States Senate 297-310 (GPO 1991); Jeremy G. Mallory, If
There Be a God Who Hears Prayer:An EthicalAccount of the United States Senate Chaplain 2594, unpublished PhD dissertation, The University of Chicago (2004).
28 See, for example, Hinrichs v Bosma, 440 F3d 393, 395 (7th Cir 2006) (noting that chaplains are sponsored by state representatives); Simpson v Chesterfield County Board of Supervisors, 292 F Supp 2d 805,807 (ED Va 2003) (explaining that the Board places congregations with
an established presence in the community on a list from which leaders are invited on a "firstcome first-serve basis" to offer an invocation); Snyder v Murray City Cop, 902 F Supp 1444, 1447
(D Utah 1995) ("The Murray City Council invites individuals representing a broad cross section
of religious faiths to give these opening prayers."). It should be noted that the distinction between invited and self-selected chaplains is quite thin: the plaintiffs in both Simpson and Snyder
volunteered to receive an invitation. Simpson, 404 F3d at 280; Snyder, 159 F3d at 1229.
29 Snyder, 159 F3d at 1237 (Lucero concurring).
30
See id at 1238 (noting that Marsh drew a direct analogy between the situated chaplains
in Congress and the situated chaplains in the Nebraska Legislature).
31 See, for example, Karen M. Feaver, The Soul of the Senate, 39 Christianity Today 26, 29
(Jan 9, 1995) (describing the pastoral care provided by Richard Halverson); Byrd, The Senate at
303 (cited in note 27) (same).
32 See, for example, Simpson, 404 F3d at 278-79 (explaining how a guest chaplain is selected to deliver an invocation); Snyder, 159 F3d at 1228-29 (noting a "reverence period" during
which a rotating chaplain delivers a prayer).
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care. Any ongoing relationship with a rotating chaplain takes place
outside of the chaplaincy context, such as in the case of a rotating
chaplain who is also the minister at a specific legislator's church. There
may be an ongoing pastoral relationship in such a case, but it takes
place outside the chaplaincy, which ends when the chaplain finishes
with the invocation.
B.

Federal and State Practices

The practice of picking a chaplain in Congress has largely become
a formality, although it was once an unseemly competition among the
clergy of Washington, D.C.3 The Chaplain of each chamber is considered an "Officer" under Article I, § 3 of the U.S. Constitution, along
with others such as the Secretary and Sergeant at Arms.' The majority
party nominates the chaplain and the election is virtually always pro
forma.35 In practice, a congressional chaplain serves for as long as he

wishes: only once has a chaplain been deprived of the post against his
will." The federal congressional chaplains are models of the "situated"
type of chaplaincy.

33 See Senator James Mason's remarks to the Senate, Cong Globe, 35th Cong, 1st Sess 13
(Dec 9,1857) ("Every Senator, I have no doubt, has had some experience ... that a sort of competition has grown up by the usage of the Senate in electing a Chaplain."). In the past, individual
chaplains were nominated on the floor of Congress and successive votes were taken until one
name garnered a majority. See, for example, the multiple ballots in Cong Globe, 34th Cong, 1st
Sess 486 (Feb 21, 1856) (detailing the two rounds of votes necessary to elect Daniel Waldo as
Chaplain of the House).
34 See Senate Organization Chart, online at http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/
e_onesection.no.teasers/org charthtm (visited Oct 16, 2006) (placing the Chaplain position
within the "Officers" branch along with the Secretary and Sergeant at Arms). See also the Senate
Chaplain's page at http://www.senate.gov/reference/office/chaplain.htm (visited Oct 16,2006) ("The
role of the Chaplain ... has expanded over the years from a part-time position to a full-time job as
one of the Officers of the Senate.").
See Byrd, The Senate at 298-302 (cited in note 27). But see, for example, the wrangling
35
that can take place in the Senate, 80th Cong, 1st Sess, in 93 Cong Rec S 111-13 (Jan 4, 1947) (describing the partisan election of the Senate chaplain and quoting Senator Alben Barkley as insisting
that "the chaplaincy ... ought to be above politics, and ... be based upon a man's qualifications").
See Richard Baker, The Senate Elects a Chaplain,Senate Historical Minute (Oct 10,1942),
36

from the files of the United States Senate Historical Office, online at http://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/minutefLbe_SenateElects -A -Chaplain.htm (visited Oct 16, 2006). The debate was particularly rancorous in 1947, leading to charges on both sides of playing politics with the
chaplain's office and resulting in the first and only "firing" of a congressional chaplain, Frederick
Brown Harris. Instead of naming Harris, the nomination motion had the name of Peter Marshall.
The debate ended when Senator Bridges from New Hampshire, a member of the new Republican majority, threatened a nasty retaliation if the debate turned political, and Senator Hill, a
disgruntled Democrat, offered a pointed quotation from Ralph Waldo Emerson ("[W]hat you
are cries out so loudly I cannot hear what you say."). The amendment returning Harris's name to
the motion was defeated and the original motion, nominating Peter Marshall, was passed. See
80th Cong, 1st Sess, in 93 Cong Rec S 111-13 (Jan 4, 1947). After Marshall died in office, Harris
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Outside the federal government, the practice varies between situated institutionalized chaplains such as those in Congress and rotating
invitational chaplaincies such as those discussed in Simpson. Some legislative bodies have members leading the prayer, as in Wynne v Town of
Great Falls," but that practice is rare. At other levels of government,
the tendency seems to be toward using rotating chaplains.39 Three states
will serve as examples of the different ways a legislative body can configure a rotating chaplaincy: Indiana, North Carolina, and Oregon.
Indiana's program is an example of a mainstream rotating chaplaincy. The Rules of both houses of the Indiana General Assembly
stipulate that prayer is the second order of business after the call to
order and before the Pledge of Allegiance,40 but the Rules do not spec-

ify who shall give the prayer. Under informal but longstanding practice, members of the local clergy deliver the invocations at the invitation of the Majority Caucus Chair and with the official permission of
the Speaker." When a local minister delivers the invocation, the legis-

lature incurs certain nominal costs. 2 The Seventh Circuit has recently
thrown light on Indiana's chaplaincy program in Hinrichs v Bosma,4 '

refusing to stay an injunction against the chaplaincy program in the
Indiana House of Representatives."
was reelected and became the then-longest serving chaplain in history. See Baker, The Senate
Elects a Chaplain.
37
2003 US Dist LEXIS 21009, at *4 (D SC).
38
The Florida Legislature has a situated chaplain, Fla Leg House Rule 10.3 (2004), but in
many cases legislators themselves deliver the opening prayer. See, for example, Journal of the
House of Representatives of Florida, Special Sess A 2 (Dec 13,2004).
39 See, for example, Simpson, 292 F Supp 2d at 807-08 (stating that congregations within
the community are eligible to be placed on a list from which leaders are invited to offer invocations before the county board); Wynne, 2003 US Dist LEXIS 21009, at *4 (describing the city
council members delivering prayers); Snyder, 902 F Supp at 1447 (noting that the city council
invites individuals representing a broad cross section of religious faiths to give opening prayers).
Perhaps controversially, this Comment categorizes Wynne as a rotating chaplaincy. Although the
people delivering the prayers did have an ongoing relationship with the legislature-they were
legislators themselves-the relationship was not pastoral in nature. While the Wynne program
avoided the problem of including or excluding different ministers by not inviting any, it ran afoul
of the dangers on the other side of the practice, namely the chaplains' prayers themselves. See
Part II.C.2 (discussing challenges to chaplaincies on the basis of the prayers given) and note 133
(addressing the difficulties posed by Wynne).
40 See Ind House Rule 10.2 (2005); Ind Sen Rule 5(a)(3) (2005).
41
See Hinrichs v Bosma, 400 F Supp 2d 1103, 1105 (SD Ind 2005) (describing the process
by which ministers are selected to deliver invocations in the Indiana legislature).
42
See id at 1105-06 (listing postage for invitations and thank-you notes, photographs with
legislators, and streaming video as cost items associated with clerical invocations).
43 440 F3d 393 (7th Cir 2006), affg 400 F Supp 2d 1103.
44 440 F3d at 403. See Hinrichs, 400 F Supp 2d at 1131 (enjoining further legislative prayer
as part of the official proceedings of the Indiana House of Representatives because the chaplain's prayers were too sectarian, and the Indiana Legislature effectively ratified them by repeated invitations).
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North Carolina,"5 by contrast, has a situated chaplain for each
house of its General Assembly, listed as officers of the body.a The
House Rules stipulate that the chaplain is appointed by the Speaker;
the Senate Rules do not mention the chaplain per se, but do indicate
that an opening prayer is offered pursuant to an order by the Presiding
Officer.47 The current House Chaplain, out of respect for the pluralism
of the legislators, mentions God but tries to avoid mentioning Jesus.
This effort is appreciated by Jewish lawmakers, a but has provoked, in
the chaplain's words, "healthy feedback from Christian lawmakers
9who
by not including Jesus.
God
out
selling
is]
[he
like
feel
sometimes

Oregon's legislature had an unofficial chaplain for many years who
took it up as a full time position in 1998 after meeting the chaplain to

the Arizona Legislature. The informal, part-time chaplain to the Ore-

gon Legislative Assembly had been undertaking his ministry on his
own, as part of his own spirituality. Meeting with the Arizona chaplain
(situated) encouraged him to turn a part-time voluntary practice into
an institutionalized job.'o The position is financed by donations from
legislators and others that total to about $1,500 per month.5 While the
current chaplain is nonpartisan and avoids policy discussions in order
to focus on spirituality," he is also part of the Faith and Freedom Network, a clearly sectarian and evangelical organization, "desir[ing] to
45 Unlike Indiana, North Carolina has not seen a challenge to its legislature's chaplaincy
practice in the federal courts. It is, however, the only state to have heard a federal case about
judicial prayer from the bench. See generally North Carolina Civil Liberties Union v Constangy,
751 F Supp 552 (WD NC 1990) (holding that a judge's prayers from the bench violated the Establishment Clause), affd 947 F2d 1145 (4th Cir 1991).
46 See the North Carolina House and Senate leadership webpages at http://www.ncleg.net/
House/houseleadership.html (visited Oct 16, 2006) (listing Chaplain as a House Officer) and
http://www.ncleg.net/Senate/senateleadership.html (visited Oct 16, 2006) (listing Chaplain as a
Senate Officer).
47 See NC House Rule 47 (2005); NC Sen Rule 3 (2005).
48 See, for example, Leah Friedman, Prayer Opens Local Government Meetings, News &
Observer (Raleigh, NC) E6 (Feb 17,2006). See also John Zebrowski, Public Meetings, Christian
Prayers, News & Observer (Raleigh, NC) A19 (July 20, 2003) (mentioning a Jewish legislator
who said she did not feel excluded by the prayers performed before the Legislature).
49 Friedman, Prayer Opens Local Government Meetings, The News & Observer (Raleigh,
NC) at E6 (cited in note 48).
Lisa Grace Lednicer, Capitol Chaplain Gets the Word in Edgewise, Oregonian C01 (Jan
50
26, 1999). Ironically, the chaplain to the Arizona Legislature would come out as a homosexual
two years later, be stripped of his clergy credentials and ousted from his position, and lead the
Arizona Legislature to reconsider a situated chaplaincy entirely. See Religion Briefs: Gay Chaplain Finds Way to Stay Ordained,Washington Times C8 (Jan 13,2001). See also Amanda Scioscia,
Steers and Queers, Phoenix New Times, Features Section (Feb 15, 2001) ("After Reverend Charlie Coppinger, the recently outed and ousted chaplain to the state Legislature, gives the prayer
[at a gay rodeo], cowboy hats go back on and it's time to bring on the bulls.").
51 Lednicer, Capitol ChaplainGets the Word in Edgewise, Oregonian at C01 (cited in note 50).
52 See id (quoting the chaplain as saying that "[t]he fastest way to kill a chaplaincy is to discuss legislation" and that it is "[bletter for a chaplain to encourage people to seek God's wisdom").
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reach out to all legislators regardless of political or religious affiliation, as well as to members of the lobby, and members of the staff. 53 It
is the organization's "mission ...
to share Christ and His Love" and to

"enter the Capitol as an Ambassador of Christ."'' The chaplain hopes
to become a member of Capitol Ministries, a network started by a
former chaplain to the California Assembly focused on placing a volunteer situated chaplain on this same model in all fifty state legislatures.55
II.

LEGAL STANDARDS: LEMON, MARSH, AND PROGENY

Legislative chaplaincies are essentially held out as naked exceptions to the Establishment Clause,5 "asui generis legal question."57 The

Court made legislative chaplaincies an exception to the often-derided
three-prong test of Lemon v Kurtzman.%Based on the "unique his-

tory" of legislative chaplaincies-the Founders created the congressional chaplaincies then voted on the text of the First Amendment in
the same week-the Court held such chaplaincies facially inoffensive
to the Establishment Clause. 59 The Court noted areas where a court
could step in to scrutinize or strike down a practice, however, giving

some potential limits to the practice.6° Justice Brennan's dissent in
Marsh tried mightily to constrain the boundaries of the exception,
calling the Court's opinion "narrow," "careful,"
and "little threat to the
61
overall fate of the Establishment Clause.,

53 See Oregon Chaplain Ministry page, Faith and Freedom Network, online at http://
faithandfreedom.us/orschaplain.html (visited Oct 16,2006).
54

Id.

See Lednicer, Capitol Chaplain Gets the Word in Edgewise, Oregonian at C01 (cited in
note 50). See also the Capital Ministries homepage at http://www.capitolministries.org/index.htm,
and the mission statement at http://www.capitolministries.org/about.htm (visited Oct 16, 2006)
(stating the mission is to "communicate the Gospel of Jesus Christ to every legislator, in every
capitol, every year, by placing a full-time, skilled ambassador for Christ in each of America's 50
state capitols [and to] work to build up the body of Christ within the political people group").
-6
See Marsh,463 US at 796 (Brennan dissenting).
57 Snyder, 159 F3d at 1232.
58 403 US at 612-13 (examining cases for a "secular legislative purpose," "primary effect ... neither advanc[ing] nor inhibit[ing] religion," and "not foster[ing] an excessive government entanglement with religion") (internal quotations omitted). For a sampling of the derision,
see, for example, Lamb's Chapel v Center Moriches Union Free School District,508 US 384, 398
(1993) (Scalia concurring) ("Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up
in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys");
Glassroth v Moore,335 F3d 1282,1295 (11th Cir 2003) ("[T]he Lemon test is often maligned.").
59 See Marsh,463 US at 790-91.
60 See id at 793 (limiting the chaplaincy when an "impermissible motive" motivates the
legislature), 794-95 (allowing a future court to examine proselytizing prayers).
61 Id at 795 (Brennan dissenting) (emphasizing the "limited rationale" of the majority opinion).
55
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Justice Brennan proved to be partially prophetic.6 Marsh has
borne few direct progeny in the circuits, and none at the Supreme
Court level. One of the difficulties surrounding Marsh's progeny is
that none of the cases that analyze it on the Supreme Court level actually involve legislative chaplaincies: most of them present different
6
facts which are analogized or compared to legislative chaplaincies. '
Thus, most of the doctrine regarding chaplains arising from Marsh has
not been developed by the Supreme Court, but rather by circuit courts
or in parallel areas of jurisprudence.
The decisions following Marsh reveal two aspects of chaplaincies
that can potentially pose threats to the Establishment Clause by moving beyond the limits of the exception: the legislature's actions and the
chaplain's prayers. A legislature can run afoul of the First Amendment
when it appears to adopt an official religion or denomination through
its choices of chaplains or its administration of the program. In the
alternative, a chaplain can raise an inference of unconstitutional establishment by seeming to affiliate the government with a particular faith
through sectarian prayers.6 The cases following Marsh generally focus
on only one or the other of these aspects, viewing the chaplaincy as a
whole and not distinguishing the two different actors involved. Howo2 This Comment as a whole is a mild challenge to Justice Brennan's assertion that Marsh
would not threaten the "overall fate of the Establishment Clause." Id.
63 See for example, Van Orden v Perry, 545 US 677, 125 S Ct 2854, 2861-62 (2005)
(Rehnquist plurality) (drawing a parallel between the "history and tradition" of legislative chaplains acknowledged in Marsh with the "role played by the Ten Commandments in our Nation's
heritage"); McCreary v ACLU, 545 US 844, 125 S Ct 2722, 2748-49 (2005) (Scalia dissenting)
(pointing toward the history of legislative chaplains as support for the constitutionality of Ten
Commandments displays at county courthouses); Lee v Weisman, 505 US 577, 596-97 (1992)
(Kennedy) (insisting upon the "obvious differences" between the legislative chaplaincy at issue
in Marsh and clergy who offer prayer as part of an official public school graduation ceremony);
Allegheny v ACLU, 492 US 573, 595 n 46 (1989) (Blackmun plurality) (noting the "unique history" of legislative chaplains as one basis of evaluating the constitutionality of creche displays on
public property); Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US 38,63 (1985) (Powell concurring) (citing Marsh while
discussing whether a state's school prayer and meditation statute violated the Establishment
Clause); Grand Rapids School District v Ball, 473 US 373, 401 (1985) (Rehnquist dissenting)
("[O]ne wonders how the teaching of [community education classes in sectarian schools], which
is struck down today, creates a greater 'symbolic link' than ... the legislative chaplain upheld in
Marsh.") (internal citation omitted); Lynch, 465 US at 692-93 (1984) (O'Connor concurring)
("[Tihe government's display of the creche ... [is] no more an endorsement of religion than such
governmental 'acknowledgements' of religion as legislative prayers."). Marsh has been applied to
legislative chaplaincies in the lower courts. See generally, for example, Pelphrey v Cobb County,
410 F Supp 2d 1324 (ND Ga 2006); Hinrichs v Bosma, 400 F Supp 2d 1103 (SD Ind 2005); Simpson v Chesterfield County Board of Supervisors, 292 F Supp 2d 805 (ED Va 2003); Snyder v
Murray City Corp, 902 F Supp 1444 (D Utah 1998).
The legislature's action here would provoke scrutiny under the "impermissible motive"
64
limit on chaplaincies. See Marsh,463 US at 793.
65
The chaplain's prayers here would need to be parsed to see if they "proselytize or advance any one, or disparage any other, faith or belief." Id at 794-95.
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ever, chaplaincies can be analyzed more clearly by teasing apart the
two different sides of the question.
A.

Lemon
Lemon v Kurtzman is best known for providing a prevalent test

for violations of the Establishment Clause:
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the
cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years.
Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion."
A major modification to the Lemon test came in Lynch v Donnelly, where Justice O'Connor suggested that endorsement of, as well
as entanglement with, religion would constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause. 67 This new phrasing served to broaden Lemon's

entanglement prong so that messages of favor or disfavor, even when
not rising to the level of outright proselytization or demonization,
would suffice to prove a violation of the Establishment Clause.6 While

the endorsement prohibition has entered into the evaluation of several cases, it has also failed to command an enthusiastic and consistent
majority of the Court.0
The Lemon test was further modified in Agostini v Felton."'The

Court essentially collapsed the "entanglement" prong into the "effects" prong and weakened the purpose inquiry by rewording the test.
The Court articulated "three primary criteria ... currently use[d] to
66
Lemon, 403 US at 612-13 (internal citations omitted). For an analysis of legislative
chaplaincies under the Lemon standard, see Marsh, 463 US at 796-801 (Brennan dissenting).
67
Lynch, 465 US at 688 (O'Connor concurring) ("The second and more direct infringement is government endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community."). This "endorsement" test was eventually (and controversially) applied by a majority of
justices in Allegheny, 492 US at 592-94 ("Our subsequent decisions further have refined the
definition of governmental action that unconstitutionally advances religion. In recent years, we
have paid particularly close attention to whether the challenged governmental practice either
has the purpose or effect of 'endorsing' religion.").
68
See Lynch, 465 US at 689 (O'Connor concurring) (arguing that divisiveness alone is not
enough to show entanglement, but might be evidence of impermissible endorsement).
69 See Adam Samaha, Endorsement Retires:From Religious Symbols to Anti-Sorting Principles, 2005 S Ct Rev 135,144 & n 43 (citing Santa Fe Independent School District v Doe, 530 US
290,308 (2000), and Allegheny, 492 US at 593 (1989), as embracing the endorsement approach).
70 521 US 203 (1997).
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evaluate whether government aid has the effect of advancing religion:
it does not result in governmental indoctrination; define its recipients
by reference to religion; or create an excessive entanglement."'" While
entanglement was separate in Lemon, here it is one criterion for determining the effect of the government action. The Lemon inquiry
asks whether there is a "secular legislative purpose,"" but the Agostini

inquiry asks a seemingly tougher question, whether the government is
indoctrinating people. Overall, this seems to make proving an estab-

lishment more difficult.
B.

Marsh

Aside from noting that the Eighth Circuit had based its opinion
below on Lemon," the majority in Marsh never again mentioned the
word "entanglement" or Lemon itsel, and never wrote the phrase

"separation of church and state." The majority argued that "this concern [about establishment of religion] is not well founded" with respect to legislative chaplaincies, reassuring the respondent that there

is "no real threat 'while this Court sits.'" 4
The original suit in Marsh was filed under 42 USC § 1983 by a Ne-

braska state legislator and taxpayer against the state treasurer, alleging
that the continued employment of the same chaplain for sixteen years,
paid from public funds, violated the Establishment Clause." The district
court held that the chaplaincy itself did not violate the Establishment
Clause, but paying for it from public funds did.' The district court examined the chaplaincy according to the Lemon criteria and found no viola-

tion: ' the purpose was primarily secular, the effect was not to advance
religion, and there was no significant entanglement on the facts presented."' The court did, however, find that making a law directing payId at 234 (finding constitutional a federally funded program under which the city sent public
71
school teachers to parochial schools to provide remedial education to disadvantaged children).
Lemon, 403 US at 612.
72
73 See Marsh, 463 US at 786 (noting that the court of appeals applied the Lemon threepart test).
74 Id at 795, quoting PanhandleOil Co v Knox, 277 US 218,223 (1928) (Holmes dissenting).
75
See Marsh, 463 US at 784-85 (alleging a violation of the Establishment Clause for both the
existence of the chaplaincy and the use of public funds to support it).
See Chambers v Marsh, 504 F Supp 585,592 (D Neb 1980) (holding that "prayers may
76
be had ... but not at public expense," and noting a parallel recommendation by James Madison).
77 The district court applied the Lemon criteria as articulated in Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v Nyquist,413 US 756 (1973).
78 See Chambers,504 F Supp at 588-91. The purpose was to give order to the legislature,
and was therefore secular. Id at 588-89. The effect, while generally religious in nature, was neither "primarily" religious nor very pervasive. Id at 589 ("[T]he actual effect of these prayers on
religion, I am persuaded by the record made in this case, is virtually nonexistent."). The court,
following a circuit precedent, Bogen v Doty, 598 F2d 1110, 1114 (8th Cir 1979), found no entan-
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ment of the chaplain constituted an establishment of religion.9 Upon
appeals by both parties, the Eighth Circuit joined together what the
district court put asunder, considering the payment from state funds
and the saying of prayers together as part of a single office." Ultimately,
the Eighth Circuit found the whole practice to be unconstitutional.8'
The Court granted review on the question of "whether the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each legislative day with a
prayer by a chaplain paid by the State violates the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment."" The 6-3 decision, written by Chief
Justice Burger with Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissenting, was divided into a broader consideration of the general practice of
legislative prayer, the practices surrounding the congressional chaplaincies as models, and a specific examination of the practice at stake
in Nebraska.3
The consideration of legislative prayer in general began with the
observation that it "is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of
this country."& The Court examined the origins of the congressional
chaplaincies, which were established three days before the language of
the Bill of Rights was finalized." Based on this history of the practice,
the Court noted that "[c]learly the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clauses did not view paid legislative chaplains and
opening prayers as a violation of that Amendment. '',
The majority took this historical origin, so closely coeval with the
First Amendment itself, as evidence of the Framers' intentions regarding both the boundaries of the nascent Establishment Clause and how
the Clause applied to the congressional chaplains.' The Court's majorglement on the record, but recognized that it might exist when "refusing volunteers of one religious persuasion while inviting others to give prayers." Chambers, 504 F Supp at 591.
79
See Chambers, 504 F Supp at 591-93 (finding the payment of a chaplain representing a
single denomination to have a predominantly religious effect).
80 See Chambers v Marsh, 675 F2d 228, 233 (8th Cir 1982) ("[T]he established practice
must be viewed as a whole.").
81 Id at 234-35. The circuit court also cited to the warnings in Bogen, which was a case involving a county's unpaid rotating chaplaincy, noting that the state legislature in Chambers had gone too
far into "the quagmire" by paying the chaplain and keeping one from the same denomination for
such a long time. Id at 234. Having the same minister for sixteen years violated all three of the
Lemon standards Id at 234-35. Notably, however, the circuit explicitly refrained from declaring
unconstitutional all legislative chaplaincies or even all paid chaplaincies, allowing that "some invocation practices can be constitutionally conducted." Id at 235.
82 Marsh,463 US at 784.
83 See id at 786-95 (discussing Nebraska's practice).
84 Idat786.
85

See id at 788.

86 Id.
87 See id at 790 ("[Hjistorical evidence sheds light not only on what the draftsmen in-

tended the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they thought that Clause applied to
the practice authorized by the First Congress.").
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ity placed great emphasis on the fact that Congress sent the Establishment Clause to the states in the very same week that it approved
legislation appointing and paying the first chaplains. The Court reasoned that the Framers would not lightly adopt a measure they thought
contrary to the amendment just ratified.'
The majority noted that there was indeed debate over the practice
during the period of its inception, but found that this disputation
strengthened, rather than weakened, the case for its constitutionality.
The Court took the debate to indicate that "the subject was considered

carefully and the action not taken thoughtlessly, by force of long tradition and without regard to the problems posed by a pluralistic society.'' "
The Court's consideration of the specific practices at stake in Nebraska was much shorter by comparison and resulted in the majority's
rejection of all three of the challengers' objections. First, the Court
found it unimportant that a clergyman of one denomination had been
selected for sixteen years running." The Court found the evidence to
88 See id ("It can hardly be thought that ... they intended the Establishment Clause of the
Amendment to forbid what they had just declared acceptable."). Some have cast doubt on this
argument from historical timing by pointing out that the same First Congress also passed the
Alien and Sedition Acts, which by today's standards clearly violate the First Amendment. See,
for example, Van Orden, 125 S Ct at 2885 n 27 (Stevens dissenting) (insisting that an "interpretive approach would [be] misguidedf] [to] give authoritative weight to ...the fact that the Congress that passed the First Amendment also enacted laws, such as the Alien and Sedition Act,
that indisputably violated our present understanding of the First Amendment"). Arguably, however, this is merely a trick of time. Finding the Alien and Sedition Acts contemporarily unconstitutional is relatively easy in hindsight against the background of Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US
444, 449 (1969) (holding that state acts which punished mere advocacy and forbade assembly
with others violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments), and United States v O'Brien,391 US
367, 386 (1968) (holding that the First Amendment did not bar the government from convicting
the defendant for burning his selective service registration certificate), but far from obvious at
the time: the Sedition Act of 1798 expired on its own, but was never overturned on First
Amendment grounds even though it drew vehement opposition from Thomas Jefferson and the
Democratic-Republican Party. See Kathleen Sullivan and Gerald Gunther, First Amendment
Law 3-4 (Foundation 2d ed 2003) (noting that "although the Supreme Court did not rule on the
[Sedition] Act's constitutionality at the time, several lower federal courts, partly manned by
Supreme Court Justices riding circuit, upheld it"); Thomas Jefferson, The Kentucky Resolution,
Nov 10, 1798, in Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds, 5 The Founders' Constitution 131-34
(Chicago 1987). A chaplain, however, was just as facially troubling to the First Amendment then,
see James Madison, Detached Memoranda, in Elizabeth Fleet, ed, Madison's "Detached Memoranda," 3 Wm & Mary Q 558-59 (1946) ("Is the appointment of Chaplains to the two Houses of
Congress consistent with the Constitution, and with the pure principle of religious freedom? In
the strictness the answer on both points must be negative."), as it is now, see Marsh, 463 US at
798 (Brennan dissenting) ("[T]here can be no doubt that the practice of legislative prayer leads
to excessive 'entanglement' between the State and religion."). Thus, the fact that it has persisted
from that unique historical genesis up to the present without interruption, as the Marsh majority
points out, id at 788, is indeed remarkable, giving force to the idea that the Framers contemporaneously considered and rejected the idea that chaplains violated the First Amendment.
89 Marsh, 463 US at 791.
90 See id at 793.
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show that he had been reappointed "because his performance and personal qualities were acceptable to the body appointing him." 9' Indicating
that it would give only a very low level of scrutiny to the legislative reappointment decision, the Court stated that "[a]bsent proof that the ... reap-

pointment stemmed from an impermissible motive" it would not conclude that the chaplain's tenure violated the Establishment Clause.9
Second, the Court found the payment of the chaplain from the
public coffers unproblematic. The Court relied almost completely on
the historical precedent of paying chaplains from public funds.93 The
reasoning followed largely the same path as with the congressional
chaplaincies themselves: "remuneration is grounded in historic practice
initiated, as we noted earlier, by the same Congress that drafted the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment." The Court also noted
that both state legislatures and Congress currently paid chaplains.9 Because it was initiated by the First Congress contemporaneously with
wording the First Amendment and because it had continued since then,
payment of legislative chaplains was deemed constitutional.
Third, the Court felt no need to parse the content of specific
prayers because "there [was] no indication that the prayer opportunity
[had] been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief." Notably, the Court did not distinguish
between exploitation by the chaplain, on the one hand, and exploitation by the legislature itself, on the other. Not only could, in theory, the
chaplain herself "exploit[ ] or proselytize," but the chaplaincy practice
itself, as constructed by the legislature, could also exert a similar undue influence.9'
Of the two dissents written in Marsh, Justice Stevens's is the narrower. Although he did not lay out clear standards for determining
when the institutionalization of a practice tacitly agreed to by a majority of legislators might become establishment, he found the Nebraska
legislative chaplaincy program to be in clear violation of the Establishment Clause. For Stevens, the sixteen year tenure of Nebraska's
Presbyterian chaplain was a clear indication of denominational pref-

91

Id.

92 Id at 793-94.
93 Id at 794.
94 Id (internal citation omitted).

95 See id. See also 2 USC § 61d (2000) (giving compensation for the Senate Chaplain,

roughly equivalent to an Assistant Cabinet Secretary, as given in 5 USC § 5315 (2000)); National
Conference of State Legislatures Amicus Curiae Brief, Marsh v Chambers, No 82-23, *3 (filed
Dec 16,1982) (available on Lexis at 1982 US Briefs 23) ("NCSL Amicus Brief").
96 Marsh, 463 US at 794-95.
97 See Part L.A (describing the differences between rotating and permanent chaplaincies).
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erence.' Stevens concluded that notwithstanding the legislature's benign motivation, the effect of the program was to establish religion."
Stevens also raised the more difficult issue of a silent majority
within the Nebraska legislature. By nature, he argued, "the tenure of
the chaplain must inevitably be conditioned on the acceptability of
[the prayers'] content to the silent majority."' Whether or not it is
explicit, he argued that the very nature of the chaplaincy would tend

to marginalize minority viewpoints by catering to the views of the silent, mainstream majority.°
Justice Brennan's dissent, joined by Justice Marshall, was more
comprehensive in scope than Stevens's. He relied more on the principle of government neutrality among faiths implicit in the Establishgrounding
ment Clause to reject legislative chaplaincies, rather thanlegislature.'02
Nebraska
the
of
practices
specific
his dissent solely on the
Brennan admitted that he had erred in an earlier opinion, in which he
had approved legislative prayer in dictum, 3 and found, in Marsh, that
the practice of legislative prayer was flatly unconstitutional."
Brennan began his dissent by analyzing legislative chaplaincies
under the Lemon standard. To him, it was a fairly simple question: "I

have no doubt that, if any group of law students were asked to apply
the principles of Lemon to the question of legislative prayer, they
05
would nearly unanimously find the practice to be unconstitutional."'
98 See Marsh, 463 US at 822-23 (Stevens dissenting) (dispensing with a subjective inquiry
into the permissibility of legislators' motivations and finding that the bare fact of the long tenure
was sufficient to establish a violation).
99 See id at 823 ("[It seems plain to me that the designation of a member of one religious
faith to serve as the sole official chaplain of a state legislature for a period of 16 years constitutes
the preference of one faith over another in violation of the Establishment Clause.").
100 Id at 824. Ostensibly, given the fact-intensive focus of the rest of his dissent, Stevens was
speaking specifically about the Nebraska Legislature, but the argument could still be available in
a challenge to another practice.
101 See id at 823 ("I would not expect to find a Jehovah's Witness or a disciple of Mary
Baker Eddy or the Reverend Moon serving as the official chaplain in any state legislature.") One
of the strengths of a rotating chaplaincy practice (or a guest chaplain program in the context of a
situated chaplaincy) is that it is more likely to evade this objection. The greater freedom to diversify, however, also makes exclusion less conspicuous. See Part III.A (describing the greater danger of establishment through legislative actions within a rotating chaplaincy program) and III.B
(noting the incentives rotating chaplains have to infringe the Establishment Clause).
govern102 See id at 802 (Brennan dissenting) (noting that the First Amendment mandates
mental neutrality between religions).
103 See Abingdon County School District v Schempp, 374 US 203,299-300 (1963) (Brennan
concurring) (finding legislative prayer constitutional under the Establishment Clause, because, as
compared to school prayer, legislators have more power to exit than do students).
104 See Marsh, 463 US at 769 (Brennan dissenting) (describing Justice Brennan's change of
position).
105 Id at 800-01. Although Lemon figured most prominently, Justice Brennan also discussed
other tests used to find Establishment Clause violations. For instance, discrimination among
religions, or in favor of religion generally, should trigger strict scrutiny, and Brennan would have
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Brennan thought the predominantly religious purpose of legislative
prayer was "self-evident."'"8 Indeed, he believed that thinking of legislative prayer in merely secular terms would demean the very tradition
of the chaplaincy. As he put it, "to claim a secular purpose for the
prayer is an insult to the perfectly honorable individuals who instituted and continue the practice. ' ' 1° Further, Brennan found that the
primary effect of legislative prayer was clearly religious-it linked the
state's temporal power (here directly in the context of lawmaking) to
a religion and tacitly placed the state's imprimatur on that religious
practice. ' Even adult legislators (for Establishment Clause purposes,
often compared to children in school"8 ) would have a difficult time not
participating in the invocation. It would be impolitic, to say the least,
to walk out or not participate.""
Finally, Justice Brennan noted that legislative prayer entangles
the state with religion in two ways. First, legislative prayer results in
the state "impermissibly... monitoring and overseeing religious affairs."' "' The legislature must choose a chaplain, specify her duties, and
perhaps even monitor the content of the prayers she delivers. Brennan
noted that this monitoring is "precisely the sort of supervision that
agencies of government should if at all possible avoid.'. 2 Second, entanglement arises from "the divisive political potential" of a legislative
issue, including the selection of a chaplain, splitting along religious
lines."3 Brennan described several events from Marsh as well as from
found neither a compelling state interest nor a tight fit between ends and means. Id at 801, citing
Larson v Valente, 456 US 228, 247 (1982). Justice Brennan also felt that legislative prayer would
violate the second and third prongs of the test announced in Schempp, which he favored. See
Marsh, 463 US at 801 (Brennan dissenting), citing Schempp, 374 US at 294-95 (holding that the
Establishment Clause forbids "those involvements of religious with secular institutions which (a)
serve the essentially religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to serve governmental ends, where secular means would suffice"). In the end, Brennan rested his dissent less
on Lemon than on his more general observation that "[tihe Establishment Clause embodies a
judgment, born of a long and turbulent history, that, in our society, religion must be a private
matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice." Marsh, 463 US at 802
(Brennan dissenting) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
106 Marsh, 463 US at 797 (Brennan dissenting).
107

108

Id at 797-98.
See id at 797.

109 See, for example, Engel v Vitale, 370 US 421, 431 (1962) (finding that official prayers in
public schools had a uniquely coercive effect on children and violated the Establishment Clause).
See also Brennan's confession of a change in heart on this subject. Marsh, 463 US at 796 (Brennan
dissenting) (referring to his concurrence in Schempp).
110 Marsh, 463 US at 798 n 5 (Brennan dissenting). This argument proved prophetic: a citizen's attempt to enter a city council meeting late in order to avoid the prayer resulted in her
being dropped from the agenda. See Wynne, 2003 US Dist LEXIS 21009, at *5.
1I Marsh, 463 US at 799-98 (Brennan dissenting), citing Lemon, 403 US at 614-22.
112 Marsh, 463 US at 799.
113 Id at 799, citing Lemon, 403 US at 622.
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congressional history fitting this description (namely, the committee
reports of the 1850s and the short-lived switch to a rotating chaplaincy).'" This account included controversies in Congress over the
appointment of chaplains, several members of the Oregon Legislature
walking out in protest over a prayer by an Indian guru, and a California legislator being called "an irreverent and godless man" by a local
clergyman for requesting that the State Senate Chaplain not use the
name of Christ."' Chaplains, he demonstrated, could become a source
of religious controversy within the legislature, coupling religious and
political fissures in the explosive manner that the Establishment

Clause was enacted to prevent.
Beyond the Lemon analysis, Brennan attacked legislative chaplaincies on more general grounds -neutrality and separation of
church and state, which he saw as "the underlying function[s] of the
Establishment Clause..1 . He admitted that these two principles "do
not exhaust the full meaning of the Establishment Clause as it has
developed,'1 " but suggested that none of the recognized exceptions to
8
the Clause pertain to the case of legislative prayer." Finally, Brennan
rejected the predominantly historical analysis offered by the majority
as well as the insinuation that legislative prayer was a de minimis violation at worst.' 9
C.

Marsh's Progeny in the Circuits

While Marsh has been influential in other areas,"" its more direct
progeny have followed a fairly predictable line. Most of the legislative
prayer decisions following Marsh have upheld the chaplaincy practice
in question; where the practice has been struck down, it has usually
been because of the prayers' content. Only recently has the practice
been enjoined because of a legislature's actions, and even there it was the
21
legislature's acquiescence to sectarian prayers that proved problematic.'

See Marsh, 463 US at 799-800 & nn 9-10.
See id. See also note 144 and accompanying text.
116 Marsh,463 US at 802.
117 Id at 809.
118 See id at 809-13 (distinguishing the chaplaincies from recognized exceptions such as
religious organizations receiving government aid based on secular criteria, Sunday closing laws,
civil religion, tax exemptions for religious institutions, and accommodation of religious free
exercise).
119 See id at 813-21.
120 Marsh has been cited in cases ranging over a wide area of issues other than legislative
prayer. For examples, see note 63.
121 See Hinrichs,440 F3d at 402 ("The House's current practice is to ask clergy to 'strive for
an ecumenical prayer.' It is simply the toleration of the failure to follow this practice that has
produced this litigation and required the action of the federal court.") (internal citations omitted).
114
115
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Overall, the cases can be divided according to whether the challenge was based on the legislature's actions or the chaplain's prayers.
The cases following Marsh generally have not examined the differing
dynamics of these two sides of the question, nor have the holdings distinguished between situated and rotating chaplains." This Comment
will first examine the challenges to the legislature's actions, and second
turn to the challenges brought against a chaplain's specific prayers.
1. Challenges to legislative action.
Challenges to a legislature's power to invite, employ, and pay
chaplains have been upheld under Marsh with minimal scrutiny. Indeed, the first post-Marsh challenge to the hiring of congressional

chaplains was dismissed per curiam after Marsh rendered the constitutional question moot.
122 The analysis in some cases has made such a distinction, but the holdings following Marsh
have applied a blanket rule and have failed to distinguish between the two types of chaplain.
Compare, for example, Snyder, 159 F3d at 1228-36 (majority) (characterizing legislative prayers,
pursuant to Marsh, as a "religious genre" that does not violate the Establishment Clause, even if
"this genre of government religious activity cannot exist without the government actually selecting someone to offer such prayers"), with id at 1236-43 (Lucero concurring) (arguing that "the
city's choice of [a rotating chaplain] format proscribes regulation of the content of the prayers
offered," lest the city get entangled in supervising chaplains). The majority here downplayed the
difference between a situated and rotating chaplain by bringing them both under the cope of the
"religious genre" and not placing much weight on the exclusionary aspect of picking chaplains.
The concurrence, by contrast, took the distinction seriously and contemplated the ramifications
of excluding chaplains on the basis of the content of their prayers.
123 See Murray v Morton, 505 F Supp 144, 147 (DDC 1981) (dismissing for lack of standing
and because case presented a political question), revd and remanded as Murray v Buchanan,674
F2d 14, 1982 US App LEXIS 21153 (DC Cir 1982) (finding standing, denying that the political
question doctrine should force abstention, and remanding for trial on Establishment Clause
merits), vacd and dismissed as Murray v Buchanan, 720 F2d 689, 690 (DC Cir 1983) (en banc)
(per curiam) ("The Supreme Court's decision in Marsh v Chambers is dispositive."). The chief
dispute in the opinion was over justiciability issues, which caused the district court and initial
circuit panel to decline to reach the merits because the plaintiffs lacked standing and because it
presented a political question. See Murray, 1982 US App LEXIS at *23. Judge Ginsburg's concurrence en banc found the matter justiciable because the Supreme Court decided Marsh on the
merits. See Murray, 720 F2d at 699 (Ginsburg concurring). The en banc per curiam vacatur vitiated those holdings. By contrast, the initial panel's dissenter reprinted his dissent in the en banc
decision, which not only reached the merits but, taking a step beyond Marsh, also found the case
nonjusticiable as a political question and because it violated the separation of powers doctrine.
See id at 690-91 (MacKinnon concurring) (arguing, on the merits, that Congress had been entrusted the power to create and fund a chaplaincy, thus "textually committing" the matter in a
way that makes it a political question evading judicial scrutiny). Judge Ginsburg designated this
argument "novel." Id at 692 n 5. In response to the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Murray, the U.S.
House of Representatives unanimously passed a resolution reaffirming its support for congressional chaplaincies. See HR Res 413, 97th Cong H, 2d Sess (Mar 25, 1982), in 128 Cong Rec H
5890-96 (Mar 30, 1982) ("Resolved, That the House of Representatives considers its historic
establishment of a chaplaincy to be an appropriate and constitutional exercise of exclusively
conferred powers.").
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The legislature's power to withhold an invitation to be a chaplain

or an opportunity for a chaplain to pray before legislative business has
likewise been upheld without difficulty. In Snyder v Murray City Corp,

the Tenth Circuit held that a city may refuse any citizen the opportunity to deliver a prayer that city officials view as insulting to the institution of legislative prayer.24 In that case, a citizen requested to be
allowed to deliver a controversial prayer mocking the concept of legis-

lative prayer during the "reverence portion" of the council meeting (a
the opporroutine period for prayer before business), and was denied
content of the prayer.
insulting
overtly
the
on
based
so
do
to
tunity
In Simpson, the Fourth Circuit upheld the county board's decision not
to invite a Wiccan priestess to deliver an invocation because it would
26
only accept prayers "consistent with the Judeo-Christian tradition.'
Although the content of the prayer was not directly adverse to the
institution of legislative prayer, as in Snyder, the legislative body in
Simpson was allowed to decline to invite a chaplain on the basis of the
religious content of her prayer. '2'
The most recent Establishment Clause challenge to legislative
chaplains to reach the circuit courts of appeal -Hinrichs v Bosma, one
of the few to be decided against a legislature -blurs the distinction
between challenges to the legislature's action and the chaplain's
prayers. The Indiana Legislature's practice of inviting rotating chaplains and paying some incidental costs, such as postage, was held to
violate the Establishment Clause when the chaplains' prayers were

sectarian.'2 8The legal issue that the court in Hinrichs confronted was

124 See 159 F3d at 1234 (noting that Marsh imposed an impermissible-motive limitation on
the legislature's choice of a chaplain, but finding no such motive existed in Snyder). The proposed invocation criticized the practice of prayer before council meetings in colorful terms. See
Snyder, 902 F Supp at 1447 n 2 ("We pray that you prevent self-righteous politicians from misusing the name of God in conducting government meetings."). Judge Lucero, concurring in Snyder,
notably argued that the en banc majority overextended Marsh, which he felt should not apply to
rotating chaplaincies. See Snyder, 159 F3d at 1236-43 (Lucero concurring) (asserting that Marsh
involves, and should be limited to, situated chaplaincies-chaplaincies that are so structured that
they become an arm or an office of the legislature).
125 See Snyder, 902 F Supp at 1447-48. The Tenth Circuit found the prayer to be outside the
genre of legislative prayer protected by Marsh because of its proselytizing effect. Snyder, 159 F3d
at 1235 (finding that the record failed to demonstrate any evidence to indicate legislative intent
to promote or disparage any religion).
126 See 404 F3d at 280.
127 See id.
128 See Hinrichs,400 F Supp 2d at 1129 (holding that plaintiffs are entitled to a permanent
injunction against the Speaker in his official capacity, barring him from permitting sectarian
prayer as part of the official proceedings of the Indiana House of Representatives). See also the
description of the Indiana Legislature's practice in Part I.B. Hinrichs's holding is loosely analogous to a Ninth Circuit decision applying similar reasoning to a school board prayer case, thus
tying together the school prayer (Lee) and the legislative prayer (Marsh) lines of cases. See
Bacus v Palo Verde Unified School District Board of Education, 52 Fed Appx 355, 356 (9th Cir
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the extent to which a chaplain-whether situated or rotating-is seen
as an agent of the legislature. The Seventh Circuit saw the legislature
as implicitly ratifying the chaplains' prayers through repeated invitations."9 Making the legislature responsible for the chaplains' words
here could, like in Simpson, forecast an expansion of Marsh's protective aegis to apply to situated and rotating chaplaincies alike. Notably,
however, the Seventh Circuit still focused its scrutiny on the legislature's actions when the chaplain was rotating, even though it was the
chaplain's prayers that were ultimately the problem.
2. Challenges to chaplains' prayers.
When a complaint has challenged a chaplain's prayers them-

selves, the results have been more mixed and sparser on the circuit
court level. Generally, where a chaplain can be shown to have given
consistently sectarian prayers, the practice is struck down. Where the
practice is only inconsistently sectarian, or when the chaplain stops
delivering such prayers, the chaplaincy is generally upheld.
Marsh itself has been cited elsewhere as an example of how non-

sectarian prayers can vitiate a challenge to a chaplaincy practice.'"
Marsh's admonition that courts should not parse the content of
prayers "where ...there is no indication that the prayer opportunity

has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage
any other, faith or belief" has still allowed courts to strike down practices they viewed as "sectarian.. 3. The Fourth Circuit took this path in
Wynne v Town of Great Falls," , where the opening and closing prayers

for a city council meeting-usually delivered by a member of the
council-were almost always given in Jesus's name. ' Similarly, the
2002) (finding that the prayers in question were clearly unconstitutional under the school prayer
line of cases, but also holding that the prayers "in the Name of Jesus" impermissibly advanced
Christianity, contrary to Marsh). See also Lee, 505 US at 598-99 (holding that it is a violation of
the Establishment Clause to allow clerical members to deliver prayers as part of an official public high school graduation ceremony); Coles v Cleveland Board of Education, 183 F3d 538, 541
(6th Cir 1999) (Merritt concurring) ("The annual graduation exercises here are analogous to the
...sessions referred to in Marsh and should be governed by the same principles.").
129 See Hinrichs,440 F3d at 402.
130 See Pelphrey v Cobb County, 410 F Supp 2d 1324, 1330 (ND Ga 2005) (finding that the
plaintiffs failed to show sectarian references promoted a particular religious view or principles
unique to Christianity).
131 Marsh, 463 US at 794-95.
132 376 F3d 292 (4th Cir 2004), affg 2003 US Dist LEXIS 21009.
133 See 2003 US Dist LEXIS 21009, at *1-4 (finding the practice of praying before town
meetings invoking the name of Jesus and encompassing both legislators and citizens to violate
the Establishment Clause). Notably, the plaintiff in Wynne tried to enter the meeting late in
order to avoid the prayer but "was not allowed to participate in the meeting although she had
signed up to speak at the meeting and was listed on the agenda." Id at *5.This Comment generally treats legislators delivering prayers as rotating chaplains, see note 39, which makes Wynne an
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Ninth Circuit struck down a school board's prayers consistently invoking Jesus's name.134

In Kurtz v Baker,'35 by contrast, the complaint was mooted after
the chaplain promised to deliver nonsectarian prayers.'4 A philosophy
professor and secular humanist, Dr. Paul Kurtz, alleged that the U.S.

Senate Chaplain routinely used his invocation as an opportunity to disparage nonbelievers.13 After a court-moderated status conference on
this count, the Senate Chaplain, Reverend Richard Halverson, initiated
an exchange of letters with Dr. Kurtz, apologizing for the disparagement and promising to rectify the situation." The district court felt that
this reconciliation attenuated the dispute enough to render it moot.'
III. ANALYSIS: "THAT SYSTEM HAS FAILED ENTIRELY"

Disentangling the two threads running through the legislative
chaplaincies jurisprudence brings to the surface countervailing considerations that make the uniform application of Marsh to all forms of
exception to the general rule that a legislature's actions ought to be more closely scrutinized
when dealing with a rotating chaplaincy. When a legislator delivers the prayer, the distinction
between "legislative action" and "chaplain's prayer" collapses. In such a case, Wynne indicates
that the content of the prayer is decisive. See Wynne, 376 F3d at 301-02 (arguing that the city
council unconstitutionally advanced one religion by praying in Jesus's name at the beginning of
meetings). Notably, Wynne never takes up the "impermissible motive" line of inquiry: the phrase
never appears in the opinion.
See Bacus, 52 Fed Appx at 357 ("These prayers advanced one faith, Christianity, provid13
ing it with a special endorsed and privileged status in the school board."). As discussed in note
128, the Ninth Circuit struck down the practice following both Marsh and a line of school prayer
cases. See Bacus, 52 Fed Appx at 356.
135 There are two district court opinions associated with this case: 630 F Supp 850 (DDC
1986), vacd and remd 829 F2d 1133 (DC Cir 1987), and 644 F Supp 613 (DDC 1986) (dismissing
a claim that the Senate Chaplain had disparaged atheists using overly sectarian prayers). The
first dismissed the "discrimination against atheists" claim but held over the "disparagement of
atheists through sectarian prayer" claim; the second opinion dismissed the disparagement claim
as practically moot. Only the first claim from the first suit was appealed to the D.C. Circuit.
136 Kurtz, 644 F Supp at 617-19.
137 Kurtz, 829 F2d at 1136 (discussing the plaintiffs contention that the "Senate and House
rules require guest speakers to utter a prayer" and therefore "violate[d] the Free Speech, Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution"). Kurtz also alleged that he was being prevented from
delivering an invocation because it was "non-theistic," but that claim was ultimately dismissed. Id
at 1142-45 (finding insufficient the causal link between the defendant and the claimed injury,
thus denying standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution).
138 Kurtz, 644 F Supp at 616-17 (describing the exchange of letters).
139 See id at 617-19 (acknowledging Kurtz's stipulation that as long as this correspondence
was kept public in order to deter future chaplains from disparaging atheists, the court's concerns
would be met). Following the policy of United States v Munsingwear,340 US 36, 41 (1950), the
court also vacated the jurisdictional holdings of the earlier case because it was found moot before final resolution. See Kurtz, 644 F Supp at 619-21 ("Because it is so unlikely that future
events will revive this controversy, there is no reason to preserve the jurisdictional holdings in
anticipation of that day.").
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chaplaincy inapposite. Examining the legislative action side of the
question shows that rotating chaplaincy programs pose a greater
threat to the Establishment Clause than do situated chaplaincy programs, and therefore warrant closer scrutiny under Marsh than many
courts have given either to them or to situated chaplaincies. Examining the potential for unconstitutional establishment in the chaplains'
prayers, it becomes clear that both situated and rotating chaplains can
violate the Establishment Clause in the same ways, but rotating chaplains are more likely to be tempted to recite constitutionally problematic prayers. Even though a rotating chaplaincy may pose a greater
Establishment Clause threat on the legislative side and a temptation
on the chaplain's side, those dangers can be avoided by a careful legislature, a mindful chaplain, and an observant court.
A. Establishment through Legislative Action
The mere appointment of a chaplain by a legislature has ramifications for the Establishment Clause even absent any consideration of
the specific prayers the chaplain delivers. This practice was approved
by Marsh and, as indicated in Murray, rapidly became uncontroversial.
Uncontroversial, however, does not mean unthreatening. Examining
what Marsh allows a legislature to do in the context of a situated
chaplain and applying it to the different situation of a rotating chaplain indicates that the latter, perhaps counterintuitively, poses a threat
of establishment for which courts ought to be vigilant.
Read narrowly, Marsh allows a legislature to hire a chaplain, pay
the chaplain's salary out of public money, and even retain the same
chaplain for sixteen years "[a]bsent proof that the chaplain's reappointment stem[s] from an impermissible motive."' This paraphrasing
of the Marsh holding gives a high degree of deference to a legislature
structuring a situated chaplaincy. It can largely arrange the office and
choose its chaplain as it sees fit, so long as it does not exhibit an impermissible motive."' Given that some courts have been willing to
shield the entire process behind political question and separation of

140 Marsh, 463 US at 793 (1983).
141

For a description of how the chaplain's duties have changed over time, see Feaver, 39

Christianity Today at 29 (cited in note 31); Byrd, The Senate at 301 (cited in note 27). The most
notable change described is the transition from a part-time position, charged merely with delivering invocations, to a full-time pastoral job. See Mallory, If There Be a God at 83-89 (cited in
note 27) (describing Halverson's chaplaincy). See also Jim Castelli, Senate RepublicansNominate
Bethesda PastorNew Chaplain,Washington Star 6 (Dec 1980).
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powers deference, 2 it seems unlikely that the impermissible
14 3 motive
proof.
compelling
fairly
absent
bite
much
have
would
inquiry
In the case of a situated chaplain, this deference is understandable and perhaps necessary. A situated chaplain must establish an ongoing pastoral relationship with the members of the legislature, even
with members of different faiths. Ministering to a group that does not
all share one's faith can be disconcerting for some, but it is an elemental part of the job.'" The situated chaplain plays a designated role
within the legislative institution. The Senate Judiciary Report of 1854,
responding to petitions to abolish the congressional and military chaplaincies, compared the chaplain's tasks to more mundane -but neces-

sary-errands such as carrying notes and depositing checks.

'

In es-

sence, the situated chaplain is internal to the workings of the legisla-

ture.'" This realization was decisive in Judge Lucero's concurrence in
Snyder: "[Tihe nature of the chaplaincy with which Marsh deals does

not involve people acting as members, leaders, or spokespersons of
particular religions. Rather, they are people who are first and foremost

For a discussion of the political question doctrine, see note 123.
For instance, evidence that a legislature specifically and repeatedly selects sectarian
preachers may prove that a legislature prefers some faiths to others. See Hinrichs,440 F3d at 402
(describing the Indiana Legislature's failure to secure ecumenical prayer as part of an "irreparable injury" warranting injunction). This admittedly blurs the distinction between the legislature's
actions and the chaplain's prayers, making the analysis of the first dependent upon a parsing of
the second. This blurring underscores, however, current courts' unwillingness to pierce the veil of
legislative action under Marsh. In Hinrichs, the Seventh Circuit used the chaplain's prayers as
evidence of the legislature'simpermissible motive rather than making a more direct inquiry into
the behavior of the legislature. Yet notably, the Indiana Legislature uses a rotating chaplaincy
system. In imputing the choice of sectarian chaplains to the legislature as an impermissible motive, the Seventh Circuit recognized the greater establishment threat rotating chaplains posed.
See id at 402 (noting that the Speaker of the House cut off all prayer rather than comply with "the
House's articulated desire that the prayer not be identified with any particular denomination").
144 See Feaver, 39 Christianity Today at 29 (cited in note 31):
142
143

In spite of the sensitive nature of the job, the senators have placed no restrictions on the office of the chaplain. Halverson recalls that early in his tenure a few Jewish senators gently
reminded him that they felt excluded when he prayed "in the name of Jesus." Not wanting
to offend them-but also not wanting to compromise his calling-the chaplain has sometimes closed his prayers in the name of Jesus and, at other times, in an analogous title like
"the Way, the Truth, and the Life." And he has often said to his Jewish friends in the Senate,
"You know everything about my faith is Jewish, and my best friend [Jesus] is Jewish."
145 See Committee on the Judiciary, S Rep No 376, 32d Cong, 2d Sess 2 (1853) (likening
chaplains to "messengers who attend to our private business, take checks to the bank for us
receive the money, or procure bank drafts").
146 This has extensive ramifications for, among other things, institutional values For example, the U.S. Senate Chaplain arguably plays a role in helping to sustain the values of probity,
wisdom, and deliberation that the Senate is supposed to embody. See generally Mallory, If There
Be a God at 150-263 (cited in note 27).
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acting as officers of the various legislative bodies they serve. 14 ' Because of the close and ongoing pastoral relationship between the

chaplain and the legislature, Marsh justifiably gives high deference to
legislatures trying to structure a situated chaplaincy practice, screening
only for impermissible motive, and fairly weakly at that.
Rotating chaplaincies, however, do not involve the same sort of
ongoing, pastoral relationship. Congress tried to use such a system and
found it insufficient for that reason. Not long after both of the congressional Judiciary Committees considered and ignored petitions to
abolish the congressional and military chaplaincies,' both houses of
Congress decided to switch to a rotating chaplaincy." 9 At the beginning of the Thirty-sixth Congress, Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts voiced his dissatisfaction with the rotating chaplaincy. He protested that "these clergymen cannot become acquainted with us. We'
....
cannot look to them as we should look to a Chaplain of the Senate.
Instead, he called for a Chaplain of the Senate "to whom we can look
147 Snyder, 159 F3d at 1238 (Lucero concurring). This is further underscored by looking
closely at the definition of the term "chaplain." A chaplain is a member of the clergy attached to
an institution (whether a specific chapel, prison, hospital, royal court, branch of the armed forces,
or legislature). The American Heritage Dictionaryof the English Language 311 (Houghton Mifflin 4th ed 2000). Notably, these are institutions defined by something other than religious denomination or faith (except for the attachment to a chapel). By definition, a chaplain serves an
institution, not a particular denomination or faith. Notably, a rotating chaplain would fit this
definition much more awkwardly than a situated chaplain. In the former case, the chaplain's
loyalties are divided between his denomination and his temporary position vis-A-vis the legislature. In the latter case, the chaplain simply serves the legislature, regardless of denominational
loyalty. This Comment still treats both as "chaplains," but the ill fit of the term for rotating chaplains is worth remarking.
148 See S Rep No 376 (cited in note 145); Chaplains in Congress and in the Army and Navy,
HR Rep No 124, 33d Cong, 1st Sess (1854).
149 See Cong Globe, 35th Cong, 1st Sess 13-14 (Dec 9, 1857) (proposing and adopting a
rotating chaplaincy in the Senate). Some sources report that the House's switch to a rotating
chaplaincy lasted for six years, from the Thirty-fourth through the Thirty-sixth Congress. See
House Chaplain Website, online at http://chaplain.house.gov/histlnfo.html (visited Oct 16,2006)
(noting that "from 1855 to 1861 the local clergy in the District of Columbia conducted the opening prayer," and "[tihereafter, the House has elected a Chaplain at the beginning of each Congress"); Byrd, The Senate at 302 (cited in note 27) (noting that in 1855, the House "decided to
discontinue its practice of electing a regular chaplain" and instead "various members of the
District of Columbia clergy were invited to take turns opening each session and preaching the
sermon on Sundays"). The Congressional Globe, however, indicates that situated chaplains were
elected for at least some of this time; only during the Thirty-fifth Congress did the House use a
rotating chaplaincy program exclusively. In the Thirty-fourth Congress, the House took up the
nominations on February 20 and elected Daniel Waldo as chaplain for the First Session of the
Thirty-fourth Congress. Cong Globe, 34th Cong, 1st Sess 486 (Feb 21, 1856). In the Thirty-sixth
Congress, the nominations were taken on March 6, 1860, and voted upon that day, electing Thomas Stockton. Cong Globe, 36th Cong, 1st Sess 1015,1016 (Mar 6,1860). Throughout the debates
in these two Congresses, various proposals to invite the clergy of the District of Columbia were
offered, but none succeeded in being adopted.
150 Cong Globe, 36th Cong, 1st Sess 98 (Dec 12,1859).
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and consider as such; a Chaplain who would become acquainted with
us, and who would know the interests and wants of the body.''.5 With
only a little discussion, the resolution setting an election for the following Thursday was adopted and the Senate turned to discussion of
the events at Harper's Ferry. ' The House's reaction, although coming
later (March 1860) and wrought with much more parliamentary wrangling,'53 was tersely summarized by Representative Thomas Florence of
Pennsylvania. In response to an offer to repeat the rotating plan of the
Thirty-fifth Congress, Florence replied, "Well, but that system has
failed entirely."... The fervent objections of some members notwithstanding, the majority ratified his view, and proceeded to an election
the next day. 5' The deciding factor for Congress was that a rotating
chaplain could not sustain the ongoing pastoral relationships that it
sought, but a situated chaplain could.
This difference has ramifications for courts considering the Establishment Clause and legislative chaplaincies. When applied to rotating chaplaincies, the principle of deference to the legislature's
choice as embodied by Marsh should be amended due to the different
relationship involved. Specifically, there is a higher likelihood of Establishment Clause problems where rotating chaplains are concerned,
and courts should be correspondingly more vigilant when evaluating
these chaplaincies. It is relatively easy to mask what would otherwise
be impermissible motives when there is no ongoing pastoral relationship in part because rotating chaplains' relationships to the institution
are more attenuated. First, this attenuated relationship makes inclusion of some faiths-and the concomitant exclusion of others-less
obvious and more harmful than it would be in the context of a situated chaplain. Second, and paradoxically, the rotating chaplain's location external to the legislative institution makes his position more
likely to be seen as an entanglement between church and state.
The lack of an ongoing pastoral relationship in a rotating chaplaincy program may allow a legislature to mask an impermissible motive that would be unacceptable if it arose in a situated chaplaincy
program. In Simpson, the county board set a blanket exclusion based
on faith, inviting only rotating chaplains who would offer a prayer in

Id.
See Byrd, The Senate at 302 (cited in note 27). See also Cong Globe, 36th Cong, 1st Sess
98 (Dec 12, 1859) (adopting the amendment).
153 See, for example, Cong Globe, 36th Cong, 1st Sess 992-94 (Mar 5 and 7, 1860) (recording
the debate over whether or not electing a chaplain should be considered a privileged motion).
154 Id at 994.
155 Id at 1015-16.
151
152
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the Judeo-Christian tradition. ' If the same were set as a requirement
for employment as a situated chaplain-an officer of the legislature"-it would clearly be unconstitutional: "no non-Judeo-Christians
need apply" would be a religious test for office prohibited by Article
VI. ' Read this way, Simpson permits a legislature to take actions in
the rotating chaplaincy context that the Establishment Clause would
bar it from taking with respect to a situated chaplaincy: the exception
Marsh "carv[es] out ... [of] the Establishment Clause""' 9 ends up swal-

lowing the rule.
The second problem posed by legislative actions in the rotating
chaplaincy context is the location of those chaplains outside the legislative institution. A situated chaplain is "an officer of the house which
.. He is located within the legislative
chooses him, and nothing more.' 'W
institution, focusing on it and its pastoral needs. In Marsh, the Presbyterian chaplain of the Nebraska Legislature "was reappointed because
his performance and personal qualities were acceptable to the body
appointing him.. 6 Thus, an ongoing pastoral relationship gave the legislature some objective indicators of job performance on which to evaluate the chaplain, which in turn satisfied the Court that there was no
impermissible motive involved in his sixteen year tenure. A court can
more easily evaluate whether a chaplain situated within an institution
is doing a good job, and therefore whether the legislature might have
an impermissible motive in reappointing him.
A rotating chaplain, by contrast, has a more attenuated relationship to the institution and no ongoing pastoral relationship on which a
legislative body could base an objective evaluation. The legislature
lacks an adequate basis on which to evaluate performance or to select
for certain personal qualities-and therefore so would a court. Most
of the criteria involved in selecting a single situated chaplain are simply not in play (or are to a much lesser degree) when it comes to a
156 See Simpson, 404 F3d at 280 (describing the reasons for rejecting Simpson's request to
be put on the list of rotating chaplains).
157 See US Const Art I, § 2, cl 5 ("The House of Representatives shall chuse their ... other
Officers."); US Const Art I, § 3, cl 5 ("The Senate shall chuse their other Officers.").
158 See US Const Art VI, § 3 ("[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification
to any Office or public trust under the United States."); Torcaso v Watkins, 367 US 488, 495
(1961) (striking down a requirement that state public officials swear an oath professing belief in
a supreme being).
159 Marsh,463 US at 796 (Brennan dissenting).
160 S Rep No 376 at 2 (cited in note 145). Indeed, the Senate Judiciary Committee followed
this analysis all the way through, comparing Senate Chaplains to messengers, pages, and other
officers: "Where, then, is the impropriety of having an officer to discharge these duties? And how
is it more a subject of just complaint than to have officers who attend to the private secular
business of members?" Id.
161 Marsh, 463 US at 793.
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rotating chaplaincy. There are fewer objectively available institutional
cues a court can read when the chaplain is not situated within an institution. For that reason, courts ought to be more vigilant to ensure that
proffered justifications do not manifest impermissible motivations.
Under this heightened standard, Simpson was wrongly decided.
Applying Marsh without taking into consideration the rotating nature
of the chaplaincy may have allowed a legislative body to use Marsh to
protect an otherwise impermissible motivation. The Fourth Circuit
therefore extended Marsh improperly in arguing that the decision to
exclude Simpson was analogous to the decision in Marsh to select only
a Presbyterian clergyman."2 The Marsh Court did scrutinize the selection process, albeit lightly, and found sufficient grounds in "performance and personal qualities."' ' In Simpson, no criteria were given except for "Judeo-Christian tradition," yet the Fourth Circuit read
Marsh as requiring no scrutiny at all.'66 The lack of remand in Marsh is
quite consistent with a low level of scrutiny. Based on the record before it, however, the Marsh Court was satisfied that there were adequate reasons given for hiring the same minister over sixteen years.
The Fourth Circuit misread low scrutiny for no scrutiny, and looked
past a facially problematic motivation.
On the other hand, this heightened scrutiny of rotating chaplaincies would not overturn the Tenth Circuit's decision in Snyder. The
Tenth Circuit properly concluded that the proposed prayer would disparage another's faith, and that the town council therefore legitimately excluded it.J The Seventh Circuit's decision not to lift the injunction against legislative prayer in Hinrichs was likewise correct. It
was properly alert to the possibility that a legislature could mask establishmentarian motivations behind a rotating chaplaincy. '6 The potential problems of holding the legislature responsible for the words
of a rotating chaplain might have been avoided, however, by focusing
more tightly on the legislature's actions in repeatedly choosing sectarian chaplains, rather than on the content of the chaplains' prayers.
Extending Marsh to protect the legislature's freedom to choose
rotating chaplains allows a legislature to do under cover of night what
it could not do in the daylight: systematically exclude disfavored reli162 See Simpson, 404 F3d at 285 ("A party challenging a legislative invocation practice
cannot, therefore, rely on the mere fact that the selecting authority chose a representative of a
particular faith, because some adherent or representative of some faith will invariably give the
invocation.").
163 463 US at 793.
164 See Simpson, 404 F3d at 285 (noting that the Marsh Court did not remand for a factual
finding on impermissible motive).
165 See Snyder, 159 F3d at 1236.
166 See Hinrichs,440 F3d at 401.
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gious groups from a chaplaincy. Courts should be careful that legislatures are not using rotating chaplaincies as a way to open up the
Marsh exception to swallow the Establishment Clause.
Arguably Judge Lucero may be correct in his concurrence in
Snyder, in which he concludes that Marsh simply should not be extended to rotating chaplaincies at all. Instead, Judge Lucero suggested
they should be evaluated under Lemon.' , This position fails to recognize, however, that situated chaplaincies may not be the best fit for
every legislative body. Granted, Congress decided, rather emphatically, that a rotating chaplaincy did not meet its needs.'6 The history of
rotating chaplaincies is just as long, however, if not as glamorous.' 6 The
historical justifications offered by Marsh apply, if with somewhat
weaker force, to rotating chaplaincies. It should not be the case that a
rotating chaplaincy will always violate the Establishment Clause;
courts should merely be more alert to the possibility of violation
where rotating chaplaincies are concerned.
B.

Establishment through Chaplain Prayers

What the chaplain says as an officer of the legislature can also violate the Establishment Clause. One of the acknowledged limits to the
Marsh exception is that the prayers, taken as a whole and in context,
should not "advance any one, or [ ] disparage any other, faith or belief""'
In a sense, rotating and situated chaplains stand on equal ground here:
both of them can breach this limit.' The difference is that rotating chaplains, because of their location outside the legislative institution,' may
7
face a greater temptation to cross this line than situated chaplains.
The integration of a situated chaplain into the life of the legislature itself is significant in this respect. A chaplain who knows that he
must frequently minister to people outside of his own faith poses less
of a risk of religious favoritism or exclusion than one who knows he is
167 See Snyder, 159 F3d at 1238-43 (Lucero concurring) (emphasizing that "an open prayer
system has the potential, in its mere administration, to violate the Establishment Clause"). See
also note 124 (discussing Lucero's argument that Marsh should be limited to situated chaplaincies).
168 See notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
169 See Marsh, 463 US at 788-90; NCSL Amicus Brief at *1-6 (recounting the results of a

survey of the ninety-eight state legislative bodies, showing that chaplains' compensation levels
are generally very meager).
170 Marsh, 463 US at 794-95. These are the sentences from Marsh that tend to reappear the
most frequently, as pointed out by Pelphrey v Cobb County, 410 F Supp 2d 1324, 1337 (ND Ga
2006) (noting the "two oft-quoted sentences").
171 See, for example, Hinrichs,440 F3d at 402 (describing the legislature's failure to cabin in
the prayers of a rotating chaplain); Kurtz, 829 F2d at 1134-36 (detailing the exchange of letters
between Kurtz and the congressional chaplain, and the latter's refusal to let Kurtz deliver a
lesson that would disparage the chaplain).
172 See note 147 (discussing the competing loyalties of a rotating chaplain).
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giving an invocation as a representative of his faith. For example, interfaith Bible study groups -including Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant senators-began under Senate Chaplain Richard Halverson. At
Halverson's retirement, Senator Joseph Lieberman called him "a true
student of both the Old and the New Testament.'". On the other hand,
a Methodist chaplain who knew the next invocation would be delivered by a rabbi might have no incentive to minister to the Jewish legislator herself, preferring to leave that task to the rabbi. The ministers
invited in Simpson were
sent invitations specifically because they were
"religious leaders,' 7. not because of any special attachment to personal qualities or job performance. They were necessarily leaders in
their own denominations, so the invitations were effectively issued to
them as Methodist leaders, Muslim leaders, and Catholic leaders. The
plural nature of the situated chaplain's congregation forces her to take
a position that is generally neutral among the competing faiths. A rotating chaplain, by contrast, has precisely the opposite incentive: when
invited as a leader in her own denomination, the natural incentive is to
speak as a leader of that faith rather than as person situated within the
legislative institution itself
This tension is illustrated by the different resolutions in Wynne
and Kurtz. In Wynne, councilors delivered invocations before each
town council meeting, naming and including the people of the town in
the prayer.' A citizen of the town sued, arguing that the invocation of
Jesus's name was an impermissible establishment, and the Fourth Circuit agreed. 6 When confronted with a multidenominational audience,
rotating chaplains had no incentive to minister to people outside of
their own denomination, and it took a lawsuit ending in an injunction
to resolve the problem." Kurtz, by contrast, had a happier ending. Because Reverend Halverson had an ongoing pastoral relationship with
the Senate, he saw it as important to open a dialogue with Kurtz and
deal with the allegations of sectarianism and disparagement.' 7 These
two cases demonstrate that a rotating chaplain has less of an incentive
to deal with the pluralistic nature of her "congregation," while a situated chaplain has no choice but to do so.

173 104th Cong, 1st Sess in 141 Cong Rec S 3763 (Mar 10, 1995) (Sen Lieberman).
174

Simpson, 292 F Supp 2d at 808.

175 See 2003 US Dist LEXIS 21009 at *6-7 (noting how the content of the invocation is

determined and the its overarching guidelines).
176 See Wynne, 376 F3d at 302.
177 This Comment classifies the councilors here as rotating chaplains because they do not
have an ongoing pastoral relationship with the listeners. See note 133 (analyzing the complications posed by Wynne).
178 829 F2d at 1135.
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This is not to say that rotating chaplains will always run afoul of
the Establishment Clause in this manner. The Fourth Circuit properly
noted "Marsh's insight that ministers of any given faith can appeal
beyond their own adherents. '79 The mere presence of a minister of a
particular faith does not mean that the prayers said will necessarily be
prejudicial; only the chaplains' words, over time and taken as a whole,
will raise the inference of sectarianism. ' 8 It should be possible for rotating chaplains to remain sensitive to the needs of the rhetorical occasion
at hand and speak from within their own tradition to everyone. '
The Seventh Circuit made the point in Hinrichs that evaluating a
rotating chaplaincy over time means essentially holding the legislature
responsible if that cumulative analysis does indeed show a tendency to
advance or disparage a faith."' This argument underscores (by way of
contrast) the fact that situated chaplains, as institutional officers, are
more easily held accountable for a cumulative effect than rotating
chaplains, any one of whom may or may not have contributed to the
effect. In holding the legislature responsible for the cumulative sectarian effect of the chaplains' prayers, the Seventh Circuit underlined the
greater dangers posed to the Establishment Clause by a rotating chaplaincy, and the concomitant need for a watchful judiciary in this area.
Although the prayers of both situated and rotating chaplains can violate the Establishment Clause, it is easier and more tempting for a
rotating chaplain to run afoul of its limits, and there are fewer methods of redress short of lawsuit and injunction.
CONCLUSION

The institution of legislative chaplaincies validated by Marsh enjoys a historical pedigree that can hardly be matched by other institutions. The chaplains preexisted the Constitution and even the Union
itself. Congress tried to do without them, and could not. The states
179

Simpson, 404 F3d at 287.

See Pelphrey, 410 F Supp 2d at 1339 ("Where the invocation of sectarian concepts or
beliefs, viewed from a cumulative perspective, reaches a certain level of ubiquity and exclusivity,
the appearance of a legislative preference for one particular faith may well become constitutionally intolerable."). This is seen in action in Hinrichs, when the Seventh Circuit examined the
tenor of the rotating chaplains' prayers over time and attributed the sectarian tone to the legislature. See Hinrichs,440 F3d at 402.
181 Contrary to Lucero's concurrence in Snyder, this will not require judges to listen to
every prayer, "gavel ready," to parse the wording. See Snyder, 159 F3d at 1239 (Lucero concurring) (arguing that expanding Marsh beyond situated chaplaincies would result in the need for
continued policing and surveillance). As Marsh specified, the prayers themselves are examined
over time, cumulatively, and in context. See Marsh,463 US at 794-95. See also Wynne, 376 F3d at
298,298 n 4; Pelphrey,410 F Supp 2d at 1339.
182 See Hinrichs,440 F3d at 402 (emphasizing that the litigation arose because of the Indiana House's failure to provide the "ecumenical prayer" it ostensibly sought).
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adopted them wholeheartedly, suiting the institution to their own
needs individually. As a result, "[i]n light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years, there can be no doubt" of the
Marsh majority's somewhat Burkean observation "that the practice of
opening legislative sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric
of our society.'..
"Unambiguous" might be somewhat wishful, however. The decision was ambiguous enough not to specify with precision what institution was being removed from Establishment Clause scrutiny. By blurring the distinction between situated and rotating chaplaincies lower
courts have turned Marsh into a threat to the Establishment Clause
where it was not one before, holding that its deference protects both
situated and rotating chaplaincies to the same degree regardless of the
potential for hostility or proselytization.
A finer-grained analysis of both sides of the chaplaincy institution-both legislative action and chaplains' prayers-that reckons with
the difference between situated and rotating chaplaincies, however,
would clarify Marsh and prevent it from threatening the Establishment
Clause. Recognizing that rotating chaplaincies pose a greater threat of
establishment of religion than situated chaplaincies, a court could extend Marsh's protections to practices that uphold the tradition -"so venerable and so lovely, so respectable and respected""'-while preventing
the unfortunately equally-venerable tradition of religious exclusion.

183
184
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